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LA  FRANCE  ARCTIQUE 
In 1895 the Secretary of the  Geographical  Section of the  Com- 
mittee for Historical Works, Dr. Ernest-ThMore Hamy,  pub- 
lished a detailed description of a highly  unusual  naval chart, 
undated  but  probably  drawn  around A.D. 1630. 
This valuable document, the  property of a British collector, 
showed  “without question, Spitsbergen, the  name  places  be- 
ing partly in French while, in the  middle of the chart, is a coat 
of u r n  showing  the fleurde-lys in the style of Louis  XIII.  The 
map is entitled LA FRANCE  ARTIQUE  (sic)!”  (Hamy, 
1895:159). Port-Louis or Refuge frantpis, (today Rekved- 
bukta or Wreck  Bay)  and  Port Saint-Pierre (Kobbefjord) are 
along  the  coast  from the Baie aux Anglois (Kongsfjord) and 
the  Baie des Holandois, (Smeerendburgfjord), and  southwest 
of the archipelago, a separate triangular-shaped island, recog- 
nizable as Jan  Mayen,  is  named  Ysle  de  Richelieu. To try to 
establish  the  exact date or provenance of this chart is beyond 
the scope of  this  paper. Dr. Hamy  and Charles de la  Ronciere 
have  both  tried  and  reached different conclusions:  the former 
dates the document from 1628-1631 and attributes it to the 
Havre seafarer Nicolas Toustain Du Castillon (Hamy, 1895: 
18 1- 182), whereas the latter dates it from about 1634 and 
ascribes the authorship to  the  Basque  sailor  Johannis  Vrolicq 
(La Roncibre,  p. 1678). The essential importance of this chart 
is its spectacular proof  of a continuous  French  presence in the 
waters and along the coasts of Spitsbergen, throughout the 
greater part of the  seventeenth century. 
THE  FRENCH  IN  SPITSBERGEN UP TO 1671 
From 1608 onwards, the English  became  increasingly inter- 
ested in this archipelago, discovered 12 years before by 
Willem  Barentz.  After  the  preliminary  survey carried out  that 
same year by Henry Hudson, they quickly grasped that the 
new  land  was  an  ideal  base for whaling, in spite of its forbid- 
ding approach and inhospitable climate. Beginning in 1609, 
more  and  more  British ships set sail each  year for Spitsbergen 
to carry on  this lucrative trade. They  soon  came  up  against the 
antagonism of the Dutch, already embittered by the self- 
interest of the English, who  in  the  same  year (1609) stopped 
them from fishing for herring in their coastal waters. This nat- 
urally started a slow  war of attrition between the two  rival  na- 
tions, both  claiming the right to monopolize  whaling  at  Spits- 
bergen  and  both  employing  more  and  more xtreme measures 
to enforce their claims. Soon other rivals joined i_nthe conflict, 
ftrnong  them the French. 
In 161  1, the  English  captain  Jonas  Poole  took  with him  to 
Spitsbergen, as technical advisors, six sailors from Saint-Jean- 
de-Lu; he ordered his  own sailors to treat them “very kindly 
and in a friendly  fashion  during the voyage”  and “to watch 
carefully  and to practise harpooning the whales so that they 
could do it as well as them” (Mirsky, 1967:73). 
At that  time,  the  Basques  were  renowned  throughout Europe 
as the greatest whaling experts. Following  the  English  exam- 
ple, the Danes, Flemish, and  northern  French also had to ac-, 
quire from  the  Basques the vital  know-how  of this highly spec- 
ialized technique, in  which  no  extemporaneous variations 
could be allowed. As for the Dutch, for “a long time they 
were obliged to take harpooners and a second captain from 
France. They  called  the latter speck snyder, the  ‘blubber 
flenser’; in spite of this modest title, he  was  in  command  of 
everything which concerned fishing. The Dutch  captain  took 
the ship to its  destination in the harbours of Spitsbergen. His 
function then  more or less  ceased  and the speck snyder took 
over command” (La Jonkaire, 1830:14). Thus, in 1613, the 
Dutch captain Wilheem Van Muyden took with him to the 
Nordic  islands 12 Basques  from  Saint-Jean-de-Luz,  signed  on 
by the shipowners for the  duration of the campaign, “namely 
three expert harpooners, three masters of  whale  boats  and  six 
others to man the  boiling  vats  and  cut  up the whales” (Hamy, 
1895: 17 1). The first attempts of the French shipowners to 
snatch  from  the  English a share in this fruitful hunting field 
were individual and isolated efforts. In 1613, scarcely five 
years after Hudson’s  voyage, ships set sail from  Bordeaux  and 
La Rochelle  to  try to install the French flag  at  Spitsbergen for 
the first time. Their venture  was  unsuccessful:  spread  out  and 
insufficiently armed, they  were  easy  prey for the  six  powerful 
vessels equipped by the “Company of the Muskovia Mer- 
chants” of London to defend its virtual  monopoly by force. 
The sad recital of the difficulties, insults, and plundering 
suffered  during  this disastrous campaign by the French fisher- 
men from Dunkirk and Biscay, together with several Dutch 
fishing boats, has been recorded in minute detail by Hessel 
Geriitsz. This severe setback  seems to have  discouraged  the 
French shipowners temporarily, for there are only a few 
fleeting references to new voyages by Basque or Bordeaux 
whalers in arctic waters over the  next  eight years. 
However, about 1620 a new impetus was  given  by Franwis 
du Noyer, Seigneur of Saint-Martin, Supervisor General of 
Commerce, when he founded the “Royale  Compagnie  de  la 
navigation et commerce pour les voyages de long cours bs 
Indes.. .pesche  des  baleines et autres amesnagemens” (Mer- 
curefranqois, 1621:800-801). In fact, his projects were too 
ambitious  and  fell  through  because  of  insufficient  capital  (La 
Roncibre, pp.481-484), but  he seems to have inspired, at  least 
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in the sector of whale fishing, some solid short-term initia- 
tives. For example, it is known that during the following 
years, the port of Le Havre simultaneously  equipped six large 
ships for hunting whales (Hamy, 1895171). Le Havre was 
then  the  national  commercial centre for whalebone  and  whale 
oil, and  even  ships from Bayonne  brought the produce of their 
expeditions there. It was, therefore, hardly surprising that  in 
1632 Le Havre was chosen to be the seat of a new  company, 
intended  to  exploit the “pesche et fonte des balleines ts con- 
tr&s  du  Nord et autres lieux” (the  fishing  and oil extraction of 
whales in northern and other regions). Financed by several 
merchants from Le Havre and Rouen, three vessels were 
equipped  and put under the command  of  the  Basque  captain 
Johannis  Vrolicq - a man who  had  regularly  been  in the Spits- 
bergen vicinity from at least 1618 on, and who had trained 
numerous Danishcaptains in  whaling  techniques.  Even so, his 
wide experience was  not enough to ensure the success  of  his 
voyages  under the French flag:  in  1632  and again in the fol- 
lowing year, his ships were  mercilessly  chased from the seas 
around the archipelago by  vastly superior Dutch  naval forks 
(La Roncikre,  pp.676-678). 
In 1634, a new campaign was more  successful - Vrolicq, 
with  six  well-armed ships, had  no  difficulty  in  defeating the 
two  English  vessels of William Goodlad, who  had  attempted to 
expel him from “Port-Louis” (La Roncitre, pp.678-679). A 
reversal  came three years later from the Danes,  who  attacked 
the French whalers  and  chased  them  once  again from the  Spits- 
bergen region, without  any  gains to their credit. These costly 
ventures  finally  exhausted  the  limited  capital  of  the Le Havre 
company. At the  same time, Vrolicq, exasperated by a Spanish 
raid  which  laid  waste to Saint-Jeande-Luz, Ciboure, and 
k o a  and captured 14 Basque ships loaded with whalebone 
and oil, contented himself from 1637 on with privateering 
against  these new enemies. 
The failure of the Le Havre company, however, did  not dis- 
courage  the  French  merchants  and shipowners. In  1644, a still 
richer  and  more  powerful  consortium  was  formed  under  the 
direction of Claude Rousseau, a bourgeois of Paris. This 
“Compagnie du Nord establie pour la pesche des balleines” 
(Northern Company for Whale-Fishing)  undertook  to  fit  out 
25-30 whaling  vessels  each year. In return, the company ob- 
tained, on  20  August 1644, the exclusive right to hunt  whales 
in  all the arctic seas (Fonds FranCais 18592:fOl14). The vio- 
lent  protests  of  the  Rouen  merchants  against this,outrageous 
monopoly  fell  on  deaf ears, because in the meantime,  Cardinal 
Mazarin had obtained  from the Regent,  Queen  Anne 
d’Autriche, the stewardship of the new  company.  In 1644, the 
company  equipped  25 ships as agreed and  exploited  its  rights 
for several years (Fonds Franqis  173299424427). 
In 1648, the  company  amalgamated  with  the  Compagnie de 
mer de Saint-Jean-de-Luz and on 3 August 1663 it obtained 
from  the King  of Denmark  the  right to put  up  dwellings  and 
boiling vats at Spitsbergen, which  right  was  renewed by the 
King  in 1669. However, all this was to no  avail:  the  company 
declined slowly but surely and by 1671, contemporary texts 
contain only tenuous and rare mention of French vessels in 
arctic waters. 
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SPITSBERGEN BECOMES A STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
After the elimination  of the French, the Dutch  were practic- 
ally the sole masters of Spitsbergen  and its riches. The large 
profits drawn from whaling  in  this  region  by the Netherlands 
fleet (Mercure fiancois, 1636:36)’ made it, in the event of 
open hostilities, a worthwhile objective in commercial war- 
fare. This being so, the failure of the  Compagnie du  Nord  led 
to a radical  change of attitude towards  Spitsbergen  on the part 
of the French government, shipowners, and sailors in the last 
40 years of Louis  XIV’s reign. Coveted for commercial  rea- 
sons, the  region  was to be drawn into the theatre of military 
operations in the war against Holland, as an indirect conse- 
quence of  this  new attitude. 
The first Frenchman to inaugurate this new  kind of action 
was Captain  Franqois  PanetiC.z  In  1674 this daring sailor from 
Boulogne, commanding a small squadron of three frigates, 
took  the  Dutch  flotilla t Spitsbergen by surprise and  captured 
12  enemy  whalers,  of  which  he  destroyed  seven  on the spot 
and  returned  in  triumph  with two, loaded  with  whalebone  and 
oil (Doublet, 1883:37-38). Three years later, in July 1677, 
four corsairs from St. Malo - the Vierge de Grace, Victoire- 
TlWrt?se, Invincible, and Saint-Nicolus (La Roncitre, p.670) 
- repeated the successful exploit of Panetie, capturing or 
burning a dozen  whalers in the North Bay and others in the 
South Bay, thus inflicting heavy losses on the insurers and 
shipowners in the Netherlands (Doublet, 1883:58). 
However,  it  was during the subsequent  conflict  that  the  com- 
mercial war took on an importance on the naval front, as a 
direct consequence of France’s strategic intentions.  After the 
major  battles  of  Bantry  Bay,  Bkveziers, Barfleur, and the re- 
nowned  “campaign of the high seas” of Tourville, the  squad- 
ron  war  gave  way to less  extensive clashes, carried out  with 
more  limited forces, in areas which  were  sometimes far afield. 
The primary objective of the new strategy was  no  longer to an- 
nihilate the enemy’s  naval forces, but to strike at the  very heart 
of his  economic power, by capturing or destroying  merchant 
ships and  fishing fleets. Thus, in 1693, Tourville’s ships inter- 
cepted a rich Anglo-Dutch  convoy  from  Smyrna  off  the  Span- 
ish  coast  and  inflicted  heavy losses. From  the strategic point of 
view the  Dutch  whaling fleet at Spitsbergen constituted, even 
more  than before, a military  objective of the greatest impor- 
tance. The outbreak of the war of the  League of Augsburg 
brought  about a certain caution  and  caused a temporary  lull in 
activities, but in 1692 Dutch merchants and shipowners de- 
cided  that  the  probable gains from a successful  whaling  expe- 
dition  outweighed  the  inherent risks of such an undertaking. 
They therefore decided  that their ships would again sail for the 
Arctic the following year. It  was  evident  that  the  success of 
such an enterprise depended on absolute secrecy. Unfortun- 
ately for them, the Dutch  greatly  underestimated  the  efficiency 
of the French secret service. 
It is impossible to know  if this “intelligence victory” should 
be  credited to the “official” agents  maintained in the  Nether- 
lands by the government of Louis  XIV, or laid at the door of a 
parallel  network of informers in the pay  of the St. Malo  mer- 
chants. What is certain is that the secret information  lost no 
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time filtering across the borders of Flanders. Before the very 
end of 1692, Charles de La Touche-Pork; a St. Malo  ship- 
owner, ordered some privateers, clearly  designed for action in 
a commercial war, to be built in the,shipyards of  Bayonne  and 
Saint-Jeande-Luz (Archives Nationales, Marine  BZ84:fo542). 
At almost  the  same time, a former buccaneer captain, Jacques 
Gouin de Beauchesne, also from St.  Malo,  returning to his  old 
corsair trade for the duration of the hostilities, outlined a simi- 
lar scheme  to  the  Duke  of Gramont, Governor of Bayonne. 
Won over by the  boldness of the plan,  the Duke, a powerful 
man on  friendly terms with the king, passed  it  on  with  his en- 
thusiastic approval to the Secretary of State for the Navy, 
Louis de Pontchartrain, and  from there to Louis XIV in per- 
son. Interested in his turn, the king  immediately  gave  his  ap- 
proval to the  plan  and ordered a small  squadron to be  commis- 
sioned for this  purpose at the  beginning of 1693. 
THE  DIVISION  OF  MONSIEUR DE LA  VARENNE 
The planned operation demanded, above all, ships suited to 
the special  conditions of navigation in arctic waters  and cour- 
ageous and experienced crews to man them. On the other 
hand, it  was  not necessary for the  naval force entrusted  with 
this  mission  to  be strong in numbers or to  be  made  up  of partic- 
ularly large ships.  In fact, it would have been extremely un- 
wise  to  send  into  such  an  action  heavy  ships  of the line: their 
draught and  lack of maneuverability would almost  inevitably 
have  reduced  them to total  impotence,  not to mention  the dan- 
ger to them of fighting in narrow, unknown  waters  dotted  with 
floating  ice  and  hidden shoals (Hamy,  1895:38).  In  the end, 
the King  and Ponchartrain chose three warships:  the Pelican, a 
50-gun  vessel  built  in  Bayonne the year before and just com- 
missioned for the first time; and  the Aigle and Fuvori, frigates 
of 300  tons and 36  guns  (sometimes  rated  as  vessels of the fifth 
rank), built in Bayonne  in  1691  and  endowed  with  remarkable 
seaworthiness of which  they gave striking  proof in the  cam- 
paign  which  followed. Lastly, a large corsair ship of 500  tons 
and 44 guns, the Prudent, commanded by Gouin de Beau- 
chesne, was permitted  to join the small  squadron. 
The command  of the whole  expedition was given to Captain 
Antoine  d'Arcy  de La Varenne, born in 1656  and  promoted to 
post captain in 1688. (Figs. 1,  2). A young and dynamic of- 
ficer with a brilliant service record, he had, it is true, no ex- 
perience of navigating in northern seas. However, he  had the 
commendable  good  sense  to  rely  on  the expert and  knowledge- 
able  advice of  his subordinates, to whom  he  gave  wide  autono- 
my in this  domain.  Once  back in familiar waters, he lost no 
time  in  resuming  his  usual  authority  and  belligerence. 
The Fuvori was  put under the command of Louis  de Haris- 
mendy , a corsair captain  from Bidart, who  had  temporarily 
joined the  military  Navy. He chose another  Basque,  Captain 
Larrtguy, as  his first officer. However, the latter was quickly 
assigned  to  the  staff of Captain  de La Varenne as technical  ad- 
visor, a transfer which  was  not  to save him from  dying a brave 
death during the  campaign. 
The command of the Aigle was  given to an officer whose 
meteoric  rise in the Navy  was as  swift  as  it was brief Johannis 
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FIG. I .  Instructions of the  King to Captain  de La Varenne.  "His  Majesty  having 
decided to destroy the Enemy's vessels going out to whale in Greenland 
[Spitsbergen],  His  Majesty  has  selected M. de La Varenne to command  this 
expedition, resting assured that he will do it to His entire satisfaction ..." 
(French National Archives). 
FIG. 2. Instructions of the  King  (continued).  "His  Majesty  wants  that  he  [M.  de 
La Varenne]  burns or sinks,  without  any  exception,  all  the  ships  which  fly  the 
British, Dutch or Hamburg flags and, as far as those which sail under the 
Danish  flag,  the  captain  will  make  sure  that  they  are  really  Danish ..." (French 
National  Archives). 
de  Suhigaraychipi, better known  as Coursic or Croisic 
(Ducere, 1895:  195-204; Rectoran, 1946:265ff.;  Aman,  1975: 
34). Born in Bayonne,  from  his earliest years at sea he had 
gained great experience in the  privateering  war  and  detailed 
knowledge of navigation. These obvious qualities, together 
with his audacity, attracted the interest of the Duke of Gra- 
mont, who gave him the command of the U g t r e ,  a 24-gun 
frigate armed  at  the  Duke's  own expense. In this ship, in  Sep- 
tember  169 1, Coursic did  not hesitate to attack  an  enemy con- 
voy under  strong escort and  he  was  able to capture a Dutch 
store-ship loaded with arms and ammunition. A few weeks 
later, on a provisioning trip along  the  Galician coast, he  and  80 
sailors stormed an entrenchment  defended by 300 Spaniards 
and killed, wounded, or captured a good  third of them 
(Ducere, 1895:196-198). On 18 February 1692, off Saint- 
Stbastien, he  seized a naval  supply ship, as  well  armed as his 
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own frigate, after four hours’ fierce combat  and three attempts 
at boarding (La Roncikre, pp.173-’174). An account of this 
triumphant -feat was published in the Gazetfe de  .France on 1 
March 1692, and three weeks later Louis XIV promoted Cour- 
sic’to the rank of commander. 
Coursic continued  his attacks on  enemy trade, but at the be- 
ginning of 1693, his  customary  recklessness  led  him into an 
unfortunate encounter. On meeting an anidentified squadron 
off  Cape Ortegal, he immediately  launched into an attack with 
his corsair flotilla, without  bothering to hoist the regular rec- 
ognition signals. At the €ast second, he  saw  that his- supposed 
“enemy” was none other .than the chevalier of Forbin. He 
had, in short, only  by a hairsbreadth avoided  the  unpardonable 
sin of attacking a French squadron. This blunder  was  taken 
very. seriously at Versailles  and the -over-zealous warmonger 
was “suspended” in March 1693. His  punishment did not  last 
long, as  he  was  given  command  of the Aigle less than three 
months later. No  one,. in-fact, seemed  more  qualified to lead a 
military  expedition into these dangerous  and  little-known 
.waters, which  demanded great seamanship  and initiative, than 
this exceptional officer, independent and at times undisci- 
plined,  but also fearless and enterprising. At the. same time, 
the King’s three ships embarked Basque officers, petty offi- 
cers, and pilots, all specialists in the  difficult approaches and 
hidden dangers of Spit~bergen.~ 
The fitting out of the Pklicun was slow and suffered the 
usual delays customary at this period. At Bayonne, de .La 
Varenne  enlisted  his  crew of 230 men,  and  the  superintendent 
BCgon at Rochefort sent him the remainder of his petty of- 
ficers, as well  as 50 soldiers. .However, .the fitting .out of the 
ship was slower-than expected. To make  matters worse, dur- 
ing her sea trials the Pelican ran aground off Bayonne, but 
luckily  escaped  without  damage (Archives Nationales,  Marine 
B289tP684 ro-v0,.B290:f0533 vo-534). At last  she arrived in 
.the natural  harbour off Saint-Jean-de-Luz in June, where  the 
three other ships of  the. division  were  already waiting, .and in 
the ,morning of  30 June  the  small force sailed  away  from  the 
coast  of France. 5 
THE  BATTLE  OF  BEAR  BAY 
The  campaign began badly.  Winds  kept  the  division in the 
latitude. of Santoiia for six days. With the advent of more 
favourable weather, the Pelican and. her consorts reached 
latitude 62”N .on 20 July. The prudent de La Varenne then 
held a war-council with Coursic, Beauchesne,  and  Harismen- 
dy to discuss  whether it  was  not too  late in  the season to risk 
maneuvers in the Spitsbergen area.  The three captains, “‘hav- 
ing conferred amongst  themselves  and  with  de  Larreguy were 
in favour of continuing to Spitsbergen  since a favourable wind 
was heading them.  in the  right direction and they could there- 
fore hope to arrive with enough  time  to  mount an attack  on 
their enemies in accordance with.His  Majesty’s orders. To this 
the  aforesaid  commander agreed” (Archives Nationales, 
Marine B414:P522 vo). 
De La Varenne, having  decided to accept  the  advice ofthe 
experts on his staff, continued  north  and  on  28  July  the  coast of 
Spitsbergen  appeared  on  the horizon. Military operations 
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.began  the next,morning. The  squadron took  up attack  forma- 
tion-off Magdalena Bay and  then  headed into -South Bay (the 
southern  part of Smeerendburgfjord, between Spitsbergen  pro- 
per and Danes and ,Amsterdam islands), where they soon 
sighted  Dutch whalers, intermingled  with  .Danish  ships  which 
were protected by their neutrality. As soon as they saw the 
French fleet, the Dutch whalers hastily weighed anchor and 
tried to escape north. Several of them succeeded in eluding 
their pursuers by taking narrow, shallow  channels  where  the 
Pdkan and the frigates could  not  follow. 
Over the next three days, de La Varenne gave complete 
freedom of movement  to  his subordinates, who  threw 
themselves  wholeheartedly  into  the hunt., Each  brought  back 
their captives - two  Dutch store-ships for the Aigfe,two more 
and a pinnace for the Favori  --.to South Bay where  the Pelican 
had anchored. This meagre booty was insufficient to satisfy 
Coursic. Convinced  that the major part.of.the enemy  fishing 
fleet  had  taken  refuge  in  the  northern ice, he  asked for permis- 
sion to pursue them  with his frigate and Harismendy’s,-both of 
which .were faster and easier to handle in these dangerous 
waters  than a ship of the.line. “To which Mr. de  La  Varenne 
replied  that he admired  his  zeal  and  that  he  would  allow  him  to 
go ‘on this  expedition with the ‘Favori’. ..but that  he  himself 
would stay in the same bay to guard the Dutch and Danish 
vessels which were there” (Archives Nationales,  Marine 
B414:f0523 vo). The Prudent had gone off northwest in pursuit 
of two  Dutch  store-ships  and had  not  yet returned; so Coursic, 
to  his regret, had  to do without  the  help of.the tiig corsair from 
St. Malo. 
The  two frigates left  South Bay on 1  August  and  spent  the 
next four days tacking about through floating ice without 
sighting  anything. Finally, on 5 August,. when they had just 
rounded Point Verlegen, the northern point of Spitsbergen, 
they  glimpsed  several ships. This made  them suspect that  they 
were cruising .near the entrance. to the “Baie aux Ours”  or 
*“Beersbay” (now Sorgfjord OT Treurenburg Bay) (Fig. 3). 
Although this. passage was notoriously dangerous,6 they im- 
.mediately  decided40 reconnoitre. At first light  on 6 August  the 
Aigte and Favori -cleared the entry to the bay, coming  under 
the  inaccurate  and  ineffectual fire .of a makeshift  field battery, 
hurriedly inst’alled  on a headland by .the Dutch (see .Fig. 3). It 
was  then  that Coursic and  Harismendy saw, to their  stupefac- 
tion,  “40 ships, all flying  the  Dutch  standard..  Amongst  them 
we could  distinguish  the flags of an admiral, a vice-admiral 
and a rear-admiral, whom they had obviously  chosen  amongst 
themselves at our approach. In general, the  ships  were  all in 
. good  defensive order in the  form of a crescent. However, we 
approached the enemy in our ships’  boats to a distance of  half 
the range of a 3punder but  it  was  the  only  thing  we  could  do 
because  of the  complete  calm  and  the currents. We  then drop- 
palaanchor and  warped across by our stern cables. 
“At  this  moment the enemy  erupted  into  ironical  shouts of 
‘Vive  le  Roy’  (Long live the  King)  and other cries we could 
not understand.. .” (Archives  Nationales,  Marine B414: 
fO524). To the  obviously  warlike  intentions of the  Batavians, 
who  were also numerically superior (about  1500 men to 300 
and  300  guns to 72),’ the French  displayed  equal  courage  and 
-l 
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FIG. 3. The  entrance to La Baye  aux  Ours  and  the  peninsula  where  the  Outch 
guns were located. (Photo: L. Rey) 
willingness to fight:  Without  much hope of success, Coursic 
sent  Ensign d’Etchebehere, who spoke fluent Dutch, to deliver 
.an ultimatum to.the enemy admiral. It was’no surprise to the 
French officer to receive the. proud reply  that “we must take 
them for arrant knaves by calling upon them to. surrender ‘to 
two medium-sized frigates like ours. They were far from. 
agreeing to this  and  we  had only to exert ourselves to  our ut- 
most  and  they  would perform their duty” (Archives Nay 
tionales, Marine B414:P524 vo). 
Even before the ships’ boat, sent to parley, .had returned 
alongside, the whalers opened .fire. Soon, according to an 
anonymous eyewitness, the engagement had become general 
(Fig. 4): “At last, on the 6th of the aforesaid month, between 
8 and 9 o’clock in the morning, the battle began fiercely. The 
enemy’s heavy fire continued until I o’clock in the afternoon, 
as well as our own .during that time and. afterwards. As they 
were numerous and  most  of them had 10, 12, 14  and  even up. 
to 18 guns and 40 to 45  good.sailors, their firing was as rapid 
asmusket-fire, while they, had enough powder. But our guns 
were as good and. damaged them so much  that  it can be said 
that, had.the sea  been a little disturbed, while  the water was as 
P. HENRAT 
calm as a mill-pond, most of the ships would have sunk 
w.ithout a trace ... [.Each frigate had fired.about 1600 shots]. 
“After five hours of hard. fighting, the enemy  slowed down, 
while  we continued at the same rate as in the beginning, hop- 
ing to see them  hoist the white  flag demanding quarter, since 
they were only firing a shot from time to time. But  whiIe  we 
were waiting we saw several vessels, their cables cut, being 
towed.out by a large number of longboats, the smallest of  them 
being  pulled by six, and doing all  they  could to get out of the 
bay  by means d the current and their boats. As  we  only had 
one boat to each frigate, all the others having been sunk by 
enemy cannon, we could do’nothing else but.  use our anchors 
to warp towards them, which  we did with  all possible speed. 
We  even cut our own cables to save time, but our plan  did  not 
succeed because we could not  gain ground against the superior 
number of longboats that  they had.available. This is the-reason 
that we only seized thirteen vessels, the others having taken 
flight, though badly damaged. Of these thirteen ships, we 
burned two in the aforesaid bay as being unnavigable.” (Ar- 
chives Nationales,. Marine B414:f0524 vo-525). 
The frigates did not emerge undamaged from this furious 
gunfight. Their hulls and superstructures received many direct 
hitsj not to mention their longboats, which were reduced to 
matchsticks. The Aigle had  lost her foremast and  had to join 
her lower yards, which had.been split by the impact..  As for the 
Fuvori, she signalled breaks in one 0.f her top masts  and  in the 
main  mizzen yard, plus one cracked gun and two others 
knocked from their carriages. The loss of life was lighter, 
though each ship had its wounded  and dead (Fig. 5,6). One of 
the casualties was none other than Larreguy, the second-in- 
command of the Fuvori, who hadken  attached to the staff of 
Captain de La Varenne, but had.obtained special permission to 
rejoin his ship for the mission to North Spitsbergen. 
Whatever the losses and damage suffered, Coursic and 
Harismendy had no intention of staying in the  bay  any longer: 
the threatening proximity of the floating ice.gave them the im- 
pression of being at  the-bottom of a gigantic pit about to close 
over them. In the evening. of 7 August after making  hasty re- 
pairs, the Aigleand Fuvori, with their 11 .prizes, started on the 
return journey. Two days later they  met the Prudent who  was 
FIG. 4. The  Battle of “la.Baye aux Ours”. Contemporary  drawing  from  the  Ar- 
chives of His Grace  the  Duke of Gramont.  (Reprinted  with permission) FIG. 5 .  The graves of the sailors on the peninsula. (Photo: L. Rey) 
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escorting two captured Dutch store-ships. 0.n 10 August the 
nirva1,squadron  was once more complete in South Bay, to the 
great"re1ief of Captain de. La Varenne. 
FIG. 6. Grave  and coffin opened  by polar bears. (Photo: L. Rey) 
THE  RESULT OF THE  CAMPAIGN 
Considering his principal mission accomplished, the chief of 
the expeditian now hoped to leave these dangerous latitudes as 
soon as possible before the arrival of the .winter season. From 
12 August, onwards; therefore, they sorted out the 26 captured 
whalers: 15 of them were scuttled on the spot, once their car- 
gos of blubber and whalebone had been transferred to the other 
11 ships. The Dutch crews were put on board the 16  Danish 
vessels, .which had been detained and  held  in  South  Bay by de 
La Varenne. Although this arbitrary measure had resulted in 
almost total disaster for their fishing season, the so-called 
Danes thought that  they. had'come out of the affair reasonably 
well, as most of them were, in reality, Hamburg ships (and 
thus enemies of France) protected by their. sea-passes issued by 
King Christian V (Archives Nationales, Marine B414:f"526 
This done, the small  naval force split up: Coursic and Haris- 
mendy set off to escort their captives to .Bayonne, and the Pdi-  
can and Prudent left Spitsbergen to carry out  the. second objec- 
tive of their mission - to  patrol.off the British coasts.. Again, 
they were lucky: reinforced en route by two other corsair frig- 
ates from St. Malo (the Phdypeaux, with 44 guns, under Cap- 
tain de Vaujoyeux, and the Grdntfdan, with 30 guns, under 
Captain Vaughan), off Cape Clear they intercepted an  .English 
convoy  of a.dozen sails returning from the West Indies on 30 
September 1693. 
Nothing  could  withstand  the determination of de La Varenne 
and his men. The warship Diamond with 48 guns, the fire-ship 
Cygnet with six, and nearly every one of the merchant ships, 
richly loaded with gold p.owder, .piastres,  sugar, and cocoa, 
fell into their hands  without a blow being struck (La.Ronci&re, 
pp.  176- 177). The fury and sense of disgrace felt by,the British 
authorities can be measured by the heavy punishment meted 
out afterwards to the the unfortunate commanders of the two 
escort boats: John Perry, the captain of the Cygnet, 'was dis- 
vO-527). 
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missed from the Navy, and Henry Wickham, the captain of the 
Diamond, was imprisoned for life. (He-was-pardoned in 1702 
(Clowes, 1900:469, 472). 
Afier this last, spectacular, success, de La'Varenne regained 
La Rochelle, where he  left .the Pklican at the end of 1693 to 
take a- welldeserved' holiday and await another assignment.* 
Chevalier of .Saint-Louis in 1703, Governor-General of Mar- 
tinique in 1716, he  was promoted to the rank  of rear-admiral in 
1720  and died at Toulon on  27 March 1732. 
During this time, Coursic and Harismendy were sailing in- 
dependently towards France. They  had  left  South Bay together 
on  14 August, but a thick mist had quickly separated them. In 
the end  .the Favori, with five.prizes, reached  the  Basque  coast 
on 9 September (Archives Nationales, Marine B414:f"527). 
The Aigle, which  had tried without success to join the Pdican 
off the Orkneys,  and the other six:Dutch whalers, arrived, one 
by one, in  Bayonne during the following weeks. 
For the Dutch shipowners and underwriters who  had  vested 
interests irwhaling .the loss was severe. Of 89 whalers which 
left the Netherlands in 1693 for Spi~sbergen,~ nearly a third 
never came back. Those which had the luck to escape the 
French squadron brought back, in the form of oil and  whale- 
bone, the equivalent of 175 whales, a total well below the 
catch for an average wha1,ing expedition (J.B. Kist, Rijks- 
museum, Amsterdam, 'pers.  comm.). Without  being a disaster 
to the enemy on the same scale as the catastmphe of the 
Smyrna convoy five weeks earlier (given  that there was  noth- 
ing comparable in the relative strengths of the fleets deployed 
in these two actions), the raid of de La Varenne and Coursic 
could  be counted as an appreciable success in the trade .war. 
Louis XIV himself, when  he  heard the news of the battle of 
Beerbay, expressed his personal satisfaction at this great vic- 
tory by 'Coursic and Harismendy: "His Majesty", wrote Pont- 
chartrain to the D.uke .of Gramont on 25 September 1693, 
"was  very  pleased  with  what the two officers and their crews 
did  on this occasion and  you can assure them that  he  will re- 
member this on a .future occasion" (Archives Nationales, 
Marine B291 :f"666 vo). l o  
'One would expect that the magnificent naval and military 
exploit .of the two .Basque captains and their crews, carried out 
with  total disregard for danger and  in particularly dangerous 
navigational conditions, would  have  been  given  wide  publicity 
in the gazettes .of the time. In fact, their importance was over- 
shadowed by the news of the interception of the Smyrna con- 
VQY by Tourville, which'was a far more specwular.feat to the 
uninitiated. Though, for obvious reasons, the ,Gazette Amster- 
dum (1693) reported in two laconic articles the expedition of 
de La Varenne and Coursic to Spitsbergen, the French news- 
papers were strangely .discreet about the whole affair. Even 
Saint-Simon and the Marquis de Sourches are silent in their 
memoirs; only  the Marquis de Dangeau (1693) weighs up the 
outcome in his memoirs, albeit in a very exaggerated 
fashion. 
On the other hand, it  is  likely  that the,event roused the inter-, 
est and admiration of all the sailors of this epoch. Indeed, 10 
years later, one of the most  valiant of their number strove to 
repeat the trade-war operation, which  had already on 'two oc- 
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casions  borne fruit for the  French  Royal  Navy in the.waters of 
Spitsbergen. 
THE  ARCTIC  CAMPAIGN OF DUGUAY-TROWIN 
In 1703, Rend Duguay-Trouin had just reached his fortieth 
year. The feats of this young  and fearless sailor from  St. Malo 
had already  become  famous during the war  of the League.of 
Augsburg. He embarked  on a corsair frigate as a volunteer  at 
the  age of 16, and  scarcely  two years later received  his first 
command. He was finally promoted to Commander in 1697 
for his exceptional. valour in the war. ‘2 Peace  interrupted  the 
course of  his exploits after this  merited promotion, but  the out- 
break of a new conflict in May 1702 gave him a renewed 
chance.to pursue  the  only  activity  which  really suited.his tastes 
and  temperament.  Given  these. conditions, it  was  hardly sur- 
prising  that  one of his first objectives  during the War  of  Span- 
ish Succession should be the Dutch whaling fleet at Spits- 
bergen. 
He  himself  relates the events of this campaign  in  his  mem- 
oirs: “The King granted me.the warships ‘blatant’, with 66 
guns, ‘Furieux’, with 62, and  ‘Bienvenu’  with 30. [The Bien- 
venu was, in fact, an armed transport ship.] I boarded  the first, 
but  reduced  the  number of her  guns to 58 and  on the ‘Furieux’ 
to 56 to  make  them  both lighter. Lieutenant  Desmarais- 
Herpain” took over the latter and the ‘Bienvenu’ was under. 
Lieutenant  Desmarques. I 4  I added  to  these two frigates from 
St. Malo with 30 guns apiece [the Morinet, with 30 guns, 
under  Captain Dujardin-Daniel, and  the Nurule, with 28 guns, 
under  Captain  Fouquet],  planning  to.take all.five to  destroy the 
Dutch  fishing off the coasts of  Spitsbergen’’ (Duguay-Trouin, 
1969: 80). 
The small naval force.left Brest  and on 7 July 1703, off  the 
Orkneys, ran into 15 warships  under  the  Dutch  admiral Van 
der Dussen.  The  thick mist, which  had  drawn  them  into  this 
unfortunate encounter, luckily allowed the French ships to 
escape  from this formidable adversary after a sharp engage- 
ment (La Roncikre, pp. 425-426). 
After  this  untoward  incident  he  naval  division  headed 
straight for Spitsbergen  where  they  took  the  Dutch  fishing  fleet 
by surprise and came within a hairsbreadth of destroying it 
completely. “We took, ransomed or burned more than forty 
whaling  ships:  the  thick  mist  saved a great number of others. 
In  my opinion there were  two  hundred in Grouenhave  harbour 
[S’Gravenhagen  Bay,  today Isfjord]. I was just sailing  between 
the  headlands  at  the entry to the bay, when a mist  came up so 
thick  and a calm so great that ourxhips no  longer  answered  to 
the  helm.  The currents swept  us  up  north to the  island of  Vor- 
land [Prince Charles Forland], latitude 81 ON, so close to an 
immense  ice barrier that we  had great  difficulty  preventing our 
ships from. striking. 
“In the  end a slight  wind  blew  up  and  we  could  sheer  off  and 
return  to  the  harbour  at  Grouenhave;  there  were  no  longer  two 
hundred ships there. We learned  that  during  the  calm which 
had pushed us north, they- had been towed out by the large 
number  of  boats  they  used for whale  hunting  and  had  gone  on 
their way under  the escort of two warships” (Duguay-Trouin, 
196918344). 
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Despite  Duguay-Trouin’s daring and  pugnacious nature, he 
was too good a sailor not to realize  that if he ventured. his 
heavy warships in these dangerous and  little-known watersin a 
blind  chase after the fleeing enemy, he would  be  exposing  his 
small  fleet  to a possible  catastrophe.  Presumably, too, he did 
not .have on his staff a Basque pilot who could guide them 
through the drifting ice, reefs, and- shoals  scattered  along  the 
coast. He  had to be content  with their earlier captures. Even 
then, these did not all return  to a home  port: several boats  got 
separated during the  bad  weather  and  some of them  were  ship- 
wrecked  while others’fell back into  enemy  hands. At the final 
count, only 15 whalers  sailed up the “river of Nantes” with 
Duguay-Trouin’s ships in September 1703. While  worth tak- 
ing into account, the campaign was hardly more successful 
than  that of Coursic and de La Varenne, in. spite of having had 
a much stronger force. This partial failure left a bitter  taste in 
the mouth  of the great St. Malo.sailor. On 28 November 1706, 
he submitted to the  Secretary of State for the  Navy a proposal 
for a new  military  expedition against the  Dutch  fleet at Spits- 
bergen (Archives Nationales, Marine 13431:P12-16). How- 
ever, other fields of operation.opened  up, with better  prospects 
of glory and profit, and he never found the opportunity to 
revenge the arctic ice  and  mists  which  had  inflicted  on  him  one 
of  the few setbacks of his  successful career. 
This moderate  success  ended  more  than a century of French 
maritime  activity in Spitsbergen. 
NOTES 
‘In 1635,  the Mercurefrencois put the  value of the  Spitsbergen cam- 
paign led by 16 Dutch boats at E800 OOO. 
*Born  in Boulogne about 1637, Panetid entered  the Royal Navy at 15. 
Made post captain in 1665, he distinguished himself in the taking of 
Cayenne (1677) and in the  battle of Bantry (1689), after which he was 
promoted to the rank of rear  admiral  and  further  shone in the  battles of 
Bdvdziers (1690) and Barfleur (1692). As Superintendent of Brest 
harbour,  he  contributed with Vauban  and  Langeron to the  defeat of the 
English at  Camaret in 1694. He died in Brest on 26 April 16%. 
3Antoine-Charles  (1641-1720), second Duke of, Gramont  and  Count 
of Guiche  and  Louvigny, had distinguished himself in the King’s ar- 
mies during the campaign against Holland in 1672 and during the 
siege of BesanCon (1674). In 1693, he  was Viceroy of Navarre and 
Bdarn and  Governor of Bayonne. 
4Among  the  officers on board the Aigle, one should mention Ensign 
d’Etchebehere,  to  whom,  seemingly, we owe  one of the only two con- 
temporary  accounts of the  campaign of de La Varenne  and the battle 
of Bear Bay, to be found in the  Archives Nationales under  the heading 
Marine  B414:P522-527.  The account is, in fact,  anonymous but  it can 
most probably be attributed  to  d’Etchebehere. Another less  detailed 
description of the battle of Bear Bay is in the unpublished memoirs of 
the  Duke of Gramont.  The  relevant passage has,  however, been pub- 
lished by Ritter  (1974). 
5The delay in equipping  the Pdican was not  in fact so great, since  the 
King’s instructions,  given at Le Quesnoy on 2  June  1693, had fixed 
the theoretical  date for weighing anchor  as 20 June  (Archives 
Nationales,  Marine BZ88:P164 vo-167). 
6“Beerbay is a very dangerous place ... Ships which venture  there  are 
often taken by surprise  and stuck in the ice,  as  happened in 1683 to  13 
Dutch vessels which were frozen in and abandoned by their crews 
who were very lucky to esca pe... It is an established fact that the 
‘Aigle’ and  ‘Favori’  were the first  French  ships.to  enter  ‘Beerbay’.” 
(Archives  Nationales,  Marine B414:P526). 
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7This  numerical  superiority  in  artillery  was  partly  compensated  for by
the greater calibre of the frigates’ guns (12 pounds, whereas the 
whalers  probably  only  had  six-  and  four-pounders. 
*Hamy stresses a passage in a letter from Pontchartmin to de La 
Varenne: “ ... I am  very  happy to hear  that  you captured a  consider- 
able  number of Dutch  vessels,  but  it seems to me  that  you  could have 
inflicted much  more  damage on thezenemy if you had seen fit  to be 
with  the  ‘Aigle’  and  ‘Favori’  when  they found the 44 ships against 
which  they  fought ...” (Archives  Nationales, Marine B291:fP591 v“). 
He deduces that the conduct of this officer was censured by the 
minister.  However,  it seems difficult to deny that de La Varenne  led 
the  expedition  with  exemplary  intelligence,  knowing  when  to  take ad- 
vice from his staff and when  to  take  calculated  risks  wisely  without be- 
ing carried  away  in  the  heat  of  the  moment.  Anyway,  Pontchartrain’s 
remarks seem  fairly  harmless compared with  the  bitter  reproaches  he 
had heaped,  some  weeks  earlier,  on  Tourville,  who  was,  in  his  opin- 
ion, guilty of  negligence  for  “only”  capauing  or  destroying  59  out  of 
100  merchantmen  in  the  famous  Smyrna  convoy. 
9According to Netherlands sources. However, the author of the 
previously quoted anonymous account speaks clearly of 28 enemy 
ships  captured or destroyed.  Perhaps  one  should  add  to  the  26  Dutch 
whalers, victims of the French, two Hamburg boats which  had 
neglected  to obtain Danish  passes. 
Wnfortunately,  Coursic  did  not  live  long  enough  to  benefit  from  this 
promise, as he was  mortally  wounded  on the poop of the Aigle on 10 
September  1694,  during  an  attack  on  the  English  settlements  in  New- 
foundland (Aman, 1975:4). He died soon after at Plaisance (now 
Placentia).  Harismendy,  who  was  in  the  same  action  on  the Favori, 
showed  an  ill-timed  indecision  and  saved  his  life  at  the  expense  of  his 
glory  (Archives  Nationales,  Marine  B415:f0374-378). 
“He mentioned on Sunday, 20 September 1693: “The English and 
Dutch  merchants  complained as much  at  the  loss  they had made  whal- 
ing, where we had captured or sunk more than two hundred small 
boats, as they  did  over the losses  they  suffered  over  the  defeat  of  their 
Smyrna  fleet”  (Dangeau,  1693:362). 
‘*The  best  illustration  of  this  was  the cap ~re of  a  Dutch  convoy and its 
three escort warships coming from Bilbao, under Admiral Willem 
Van Wassenaar, on  25  March  1697 (La Roncikre, pp.  228-230). 
13Herpin Des Marets  from La Tranche, in Poitou; sub-lieutenant in 
1670, lieutenant in 1682, captain in 1691, degraded in 1693, re- 
established as lieutenant in 1701; died in Brest on 1 February 1729 
(Archives  Nationales,  Marine  CI:  161). 
I4Jean-Jacques Des Marques, from Soissons; midshipman in 1683, 
sub-lieutenant  in  1691,  lieutenant  in  16%;  died  at  Brest  on  2 
November  1719  (Archives  Nationales,  Marine  CI:150). 
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